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Abstract 
The study clarifies the questionable economics of foreign aid for inclusive human 
development. It investigates the effect of a plethora of foreign aid dynamics on the inequality 
adjusted human development index. Contemporary and non-contemporary OLS, Fixed-effects 
and a system GMM technique with forward orthogonal deviations are employed. The 
empirical evidence is based on a sample of 53 African countries for the period 2005-2012. 
The following findings are established. First, the impacts of aid dynamics with high degrees 
of substitution are positive. These include, aid for: social infrastructure, economic 
infrastructure, the productive sector and the multi-sector.  Second, the effect of humanitarian 
assistance is consistently negative across specifications and models. Third, the effects of 
programme assistance and action on debts are ambiguous because they become positive with 
the GMM technique. Justifications for these changes and clarifications with respect to existing 
literature are provided. Policy implications are discussed in light of Piketty’s celebrated 
literature and the post-2015 development agenda.  We also provide some recommendations 
for a rethinking of theories and models on which development assistance is based. 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
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1. Introduction 
The post-2015 challenges of sustainable development have clearly articulated the need 
for more inclusive policies (United Nations: UN, 2013, pp. 7-13). According to the narrative, 
development assistance is a critical factor in addressing the issues. In this light, pitfalls of the 
past can be avoided, inter alia:   ‘Output may be growing, and yet the mass of the people may 
be becoming poorer’ (Lewis, 1955).  ‘Lewis led all developing countries to water, 
proverbially speaking, some African countries have so far chosen not to drink’  (Amavilah, 
2014). The celebrated ‘capital in the 21st century’ from Piketty (2014) has taken African 
nations to the stream again and this study partially assesses the challenging policy syndrome 
of how development assistance can help them to drink this time around.  
The  above intuition is inconsistent with a  recent strand of literature which has raised 
doubts about the effectiveness of foreign aid (Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Monni & Spaventa, 
2013; Banuri, 2013; Titumir & Kamal, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Marglin, 2013). 
According to the narrative, aid to developing countries is substantially motivated by a neo-
colonial agenda (Amin, 2014).  A stance that is shared by Kindiki (2011) who has 
recommended Africa to strategically limit its reliance on international aid systems and 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on the continent’s entrapment in neo-colonial webs of influence. 
Amin (2014) has further emphasised that models of development in developing countries 
should reflect what is needed by poor nations, as opposed to what Donors think is good for 
them
2
. The need for developed countries to guide developing nations towards industrialisation 
in the view of Piketty is indirectly shared by Obeng-Odoom (2013) who has also 
recommended that policies towards development assistance should be guided by genuine 
needs in recipient countries. This strand is broadly consistent with celebrated aid literatures on 
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in Arvin & Lew (2010ab, 2011, 2012ab). 
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the need to rethink foreign aid policies, inter alia: the Eubank (2012) Somaliland hypothesis, 
Moyo’s (2009) Dead Aid and Collier’s (2007) Bottom Billion3.  
In light of the above, a recent stream of  African development  literature has presented 
cases for the appealing effect of foreign aid on African institutions (Asongu & Jellal, 2013; 
Efobi et al., 2014), especially in dampening the adverse effects from some neoliberal policies 
(Kangoye, 2013). Some conclusions in the stream include, inter alia: the positive effect of aid 
depends on a conducive policy environment, measurement of aid and specification of the aid-
growth nexus (Gyimah-Brempong & Racine, 2014), aid in primary education positively 
affects growth (Asiedu, 2014) and in Sierra Leone, only aid reflected in grants have effects 
that are pro-poor, with the impact more apparent in the long-run (Kargbo & Sen, 2014).  
The above strand is also a consequence of a number of qualitative and quantitative 
studies that have focused on reinventing foreign aid (Easterly, 2008). These include, among 
others: the experiment on ending poverty by Sachs; the World Bank and IMF Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (PRS);  the cost effectiveness of interventions  (Banerjee & He, 2008);  
the imperative for more rigorous evaluations (Pritchett, 2008); Randomised Control Trials 
(RCTs, Duflo & Kremer, 2008); amputation, intensification and policy change based reforms  
(Pritchett & Woolcook, 2008); more articulation on ‘searching for solutions’ than on 
‘planning for solutions’ (Easterly, 2006); APC or Advanced Purchase Commitment (Kremer, 
2008);  novel initiatives at the global level (Radelet & Levine, 2008); ‘aid vouchers’ to 
provide incentives for better/competitive  service delivery by agencies of aid  (Easterly, 2002, 
2008) and a broad range of measures for more inclusive foreign land acquisition policies 
(Osabuohien, 2015; Asongu & Nguena, 2015).  
                                                             
3 There is also a heated debate on the effect of foreign aid on institutions in Africa. The interested reader can 
start from Okada & Samreth (2012) before exploring the plethora of studies that are focused on the underlying 
paper, among others: Asongu (2012, 2013), Asongu & Jellal (2013) and Efobi et al. (2014).   
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Unfortunately, as far as we have reviewed there is currently no study in the literature 
that has responded to Piketty’s celebrated literature in light of reinventing development 
assistance.  To the best of our knowledge, responses to Piketty’s study have centered on 
reviews and commentaries. These include, inter alia: cross-checking of facts (Krusell & 
Smith, 2014; Branko, 2014); different perspectives to the inequality issue (Stiglitz, 2014); 
concerns about data quality (Reynolds, 2014) and reviews (Homburg, 2014; Allen, 2014).  
By positioning the study on the instrumentality of foreign aid for inclusive 
development, we contribute by extending responses to Piketty’s work and at the same time 
complementing the evolving literature on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. 
More specifically, we clarify the findings of Asongu (2014a) which have presented the 
‘questionable economics of development assistance in Africa’. The underlying study leaves 
room for improvement in at least three areas. First, it overlooks the heterogeneity of aid 
dynamics. Accordingly, three types of aid variables have been employed: total aid, aid from 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and aid from Multilateral Donors (MD). We 
complement this area on variables by instead using 7 different types of aid, notably: aid to 
social infrastructure, aid to economic infrastructure, aid to the productive sector, aid to the 
multi-sector, programme assistance, action on debt and humanitarian assistance. The intuition 
for this complementarity is that the effect of aid on inclusive human development should 
depend on the type of aid because there are various motives behind aid. These same variables 
have been recently used by Efobi et al. (2014) in clarifying murky empirical conclusions on 
the effect of foreign aid on corruption. 
Second, we employ a more robust methodology. The two-stage least squares method 
employed by the underlying study uses blanked instruments and fails to control for cross-
sectional dependence and country-specific effects. We use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), 
Fixed-Effects and System Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) regressions. The GMM 
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estimation is modelled with forward orthogonal deviations as opposed to differencing to 
control for cross-sectional dependence. Third, the effect of foreign aid on development may 
require some lags and hence could be non-contemporaneous. We address this concern by 
modelling aid as both contemporary and non-contemporary.  
Consistent with the first paragraph of the introduction, foreign aid can be instrumental 
in preparing developing countries for industrialisation in the narrative of Piketty (2014) and 
not in that of the Kuznets’ (1955, 1971) conjectures  which sustain  an n-shape nexus between 
inequality and industrialisation. Accordingly, by focusing more on inclusive human 
development as opposed to growth, concerns of  “immiserizing growth” (Bhagwati, 1958)4 
can be handled to improve the encouraging poverty-reduction trend of African countries 
relative to the other regions of the World (Fosu, 2015).  The rest of the study is organised as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the data and methodology. The empirical analysis and results are 
covered in Section 3. We conclude with Section 4.  
 
 
2. Data and Methodology  
2.1 Data 
We examine a panel of 53 African countries with data from the Organisation of Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
and the World Bank for the period 2005 to 2012. The periodicity and aid indicators are 
consistent with those employed by Efobi et al. (2014) in clarifying the debate on ‘the effect of 
foreign aid on corruption’ from Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2013) & Asongu & Jellal 
(2013).  The dependent variable which is the inequality adjusted human development index 
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(IHDI) is in accordance with that employed by the underlying study we seek to clarify 
(Asongu, 2014a).  
The aid and dependent variables are summarised in Table 1 below. The summary 
statistics shows that the variables are quite comparable. From the variations, we can expect 
reasonable estimated relationships. The aid variables are defined in logarithms to enable 
comparisons in means and standard deviations. The employment of control variables 
proliferates instruments or limits ‘over-identification restrictions’ which substantially bias the 
system GMM results. Accordingly, some GMM specifications entail limited or no control 
variables for this reason (see Osabuohien & Efobi, 2013, p. 303).  
 
Table 1: Definition of variables, sources and Summary statistics 
        
 Definitions/ Sources Mean S.D Min Max Obs 
        
Inclusive 
development  
Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index 
(log)/UNDP, World Bank WDI. 
0.486 0.130 0.129 0.809 351 
       
 
Aid to Social 
Infrastructure 
Foreign aid directed at human development 
purposes such as education, water supply and 
sanitation (log)/OECD. 
 
2.012 
 
0.622 
 
0.113 
 
3.077 
 
424 
       
Aid to 
Economic 
Infrastructure 
Foreign aid directed at infrastructures like 
transport, communication and energy (log)/OECD. 
 
0.812 
 
1.201 
 
-2.000 
 
3.067 
 
415 
       
Aid to 
Productive 
sector 
Foreign aid directed at the productive sector like 
agriculture, industry, mining, construction, trade 
and tourism(log)/OECD. 
 
1.017 
 
0.830 
 
-1.699 
 
2.741 
 
424 
       
Aid to Multi 
Sector 
Foreign aid directed at other sectorial development 
like rural development (log)/OECD. 
1.023 0.682 -1.699 2.541 424 
       
Programme 
Assistance 
Foreign aid directed towards program related 
assistance like food aid, disaster and war 
(log)/OECD. 
 
1.116 
 
0.924 
 
-2.000 
 
3.103 
 
350 
       
Action on debt Aid directed towards debt relief (log)/OECD. 0.535 1.310 -2.000 4.045 321 
       
Humanitarian  
Assistance  
Aid allocated for Humanitarian Assistance 
(log)/OECD 
0.894 1.004 -2.000 3.038 400 
        
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations.  Log: logarithm. OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-
operation & Development. UNDP: United Nations Development Program. WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  
 
The correlation analysis in Table 2 below enables us to mitigate multicollinearity and 
overparameterization issues apparent in the first-four variables, notably aid to: social 
infrastructure, economic infrastructure, production sector and multi-sector.  
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Table 2: Correlation matrix 
         
SocioInfra EcoInfra ProdSec MultiSec Prog. Assis Debt Action Humani IHDI  
1.000 0.756 0.760 0.784 0.284 0.111 0.419 -0.184 SocioInfra 
 1.000 0.675 0.693 0.203 0.155 0.150 0.029 EcoInfra 
  1.000 0.733 0.304 0.112 0.262 -0.139 ProdSec 
   1.000 0.297 0.067 0.349 -0.189 MultiSec 
    1.000 -0.022 0.351 -0.359 Prog. Assis 
     1.000 0.006 -0.007 Debt Action 
      1.000 -0.553 Humani 
       1.000 IHDI 
         
SocioInfra: Aid to Social Infrastructure & Services. EcoInfra: Aid to Economic Infrastructure and Services. ProdSec: Aid to Production 
Services. MultiSec: Aid to Multi Sector Development.  Prog. Assis: Programme Assistance.  Debt Action: Aid for debt relief. Humani: Aid 
for Humanitarian Assistance. IHDI: Inequality adjusted Human Development Index.  
 
 
2.2 Methodology  
 
Consistent with the motivation, we employ three estimation techniques: panel OLS, panel 
Fixed-effects (FE) and Dynamic System GMM. While the first-two independently entail both 
contemporary and non-contemporary specifications, the third is both contemporary and non-
contemporary.  OLS and FE are Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in 
standard errors. The choice of a FE or random-effect (RE) specification is contingent on the 
outcome of the Hausman test for endogeneity.  
The GMM estimation consists of employing the Arellano & Bover (1995) technique. 
Instead of using differencing in the instrumentation process, we prefer forward orthogonal 
deviations. This specification is more efficient in the presence of cross-sectional dependence 
to avoid estimated coefficients being biased (Baltagi, 2008). As shown by Love & Zicchino 
(2006), the employment of forward orthogonal deviations controls for specific-effects arising 
from cross-sectional dependence. In this light, one period lags in the regressors are 
appropriate since they are not correlated with the transformed error term. Moreover, the 
adoption of one lag is also in accordance with the baseline OLS and FE non-contemporary 
specifications.  
The modelling is in line with Roodman (2009ab) and specifications are two-step or 
heteroscedasticity-consistent, because one-step specifications assume homoscedasticity. The 
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validity of the models is further checked by ensuring that the results satisfy diagnostics of 
post-estimation. These include: restriction of identification or mitigation of instrument 
proliferation (by verifying that the number of cross-sections is higher than the number of 
instruments); the Sargan test for over-identification, the Arellano & Bond (1991) second-
order serial correlation test and the difference-in-Hansen test for instrument exogeneity. For 
brevity, we do not present the equations but they can be provided upon request.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 
Table 3 presents contemporary and non-contemporary results. Panel A shows OLS while 
Panel B reveals FE estimations. The specifications are articulated to control for the 
multicollinearity issues identified in Table 2. Only FE estimations are relevant to Panel B 
because the null hypotheses of the Hausman test for endogeneity are rejected, confirming the 
presence of endogeneity.  
The following findings are established in Panel A. First, aid for program and 
humanitarian assistances affect the IHDI negatively. Second, there is no apparent impact 
from action on debts. Third, the effects of the dynamics with a high degree of substitution are 
consistently positive across specifications. Fourth, from a broad perspective, magnitudes of 
effects from non-contemporary specifications are slightly higher.  
The following are noticeable with the FE estimations in Panel B. First, the previously 
insignificant effects from action on debt are now negatively significant. Second, the 
previously negative effects of program and humanitarian assistances are no longer apparent. 
Third, but for aid to Multi-sector development, the other three highly correlated aid dynamics 
have significant positive effects as in Panel A.  
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Table 3: Contemporary and Non-contemporary OLS and Fixed-effects 
          
Dependent variable: Inequality adjusted Human  Development Index (IHDI) 
 
Panel A: Baseline Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE OLS) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
          
Constant  0.410*** 0.499*** 0.495*** 0.472*** Constant  0.399*** 0.498*** 0.498*** 0.471*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance -0.034*** -0.037*** -0.033*** -0.030*** Prog. Assistance (-1) -0.033*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.006) 
Action on Debt -0.0004 -0.002 0.0002 0.0003 Action on Debt (-1) -0.001 -0.004 -0.0009 -0.0004 
 (0.954) (0.679) (0.971) (0.956)  (0.842) (0.537) (0.899) (0.955) 
Hum. Assistance  -0.052*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.047*** Hum. Assistance (-1) -0.054*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.048*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) 
Social Infrastructure 0.062*** --- --- --- Social Infrastructure(-1) 0.069*** --- --- --- 
 (0.003)     (0.000)    
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.037*** --- --- Econ. Infrastructure (-1) --- 0.043*** --- --- 
  (0.000)     (0.000)   
Productive Sector --- --- 0.031** --- Productive Sector(-1) --- --- 0.031** --- 
   (0.036)     (0.039)  
Multi Sector --- --- --- 0.050*** Multi Sector(-1) --- --- --- 0.054*** 
    (0.003)     (0.004) 
          
Adjusted R² 0.308 0.376 0.271 0.290 Adjusted R² 0.316 0.407 0.261 0.286 
Fisher  27.22*** 36.47*** 22.926*** 25.017*** Fisher  25.31*** 37.06*** 19.57*** 22.08*** 
Countries  42 42 42 42 Countries  41 41 41 41 
Observations  236 236 236 236 Observations  211 211 211 211 
          
          
Panel B: Contemporary and Non-contemporary effects (HAC SE Panel Fixed-Effects) 
 
 Contemporary  effects  Non-Contemporary effects 
    
Constant  0.393*** 0.433*** 0.427*** 0.431*** Constant  0.408*** 0.443*** 0.436*** 0.441*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002* Prog. Assistance (-1) -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.00002 0.0001 
 (0.251) (0.142) (0.103) (0.090)  (0.733) (0.721) (0.988) (0.932) 
Action on Debt -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.008*** Action on Debt (-1) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hum. Assistance  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 Hum. Assistance (-1) -0.0009 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0004 
 (0.551) (0.421) (0.354) (0.558)  (0.704) (0.957) (0.735) (0.879) 
Social Infrastructure 0.020*** --- --- --- Social Infrastructure(-1) 0.019*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000)     (0.000)    
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.003*** --- --- Econ. Infrastructure (-1) --- 0.005*** --- --- 
  (0.002)     (0.000)   
Productive Sector --- --- 0.007* --- Productive Sector(-1) --- --- 0.009** --- 
   (0.068)     (0.021)  
Multi Sector --- --- --- 0.004 Multi Sector(-1) --- --- --- 0.006 
    (0.148)     (0.104) 
          
Hausman  39.984*** 66.307*** 37.034*** 44.23*** Hausman  29.692*** 60.04*** 26.31*** 33.33*** 
Within  R² 0.341 0.326 0.331 0.312 Within  R² 0.264 0.288 0.281 0.246 
LSDV R² 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 LSDV R² 0.986 0.987 0.986 0.986 
Fisher (LSDV) 257.11*** 251.38*** 253.45*** 246.14*** Fisher  278.68*** 288.02*** 285.23*** 271.86*** 
Countries  42 42 42 42 Countries  41 41 41 41 
Observations  236 236 236 236 Observations  211 211 211 211 
          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Econ: Economic. Prog: Programme. Hum: Humanitarian. 
LSDV: Least Squares Dummy Variable.  HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Errors. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares.  
 
Table 4 below presents the dynamic system GMM findings and comparative full 
specifications for further robustness purposes. The latter in Panel B is based on the relaxation 
of concerns about multicollinearity and overparameterization. Hence, all aid variables enter 
into the specifications. The findings which are based on contemporary and non-contemporary 
OLS and FE regressions confirm the results of Table 3.  
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Table 4: Dynamic GMM and comparative full specifications  
          
 Panel A: Dynamic Panel System GMM Panel B: Panel OLS and Fixed-Effects 
   
 Dynamic System GMM Baseline HAC SE OLS Fixed-Effects HAC SE 
 Contemporary and Non-contemporary Cont Non-cont Cont Non-cont 
      
IHDI(-1) 0.986*** 0.992*** 0.989*** 0.993*** 0.970*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Constant  0.004 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.002 0.485*** 0.473*** 0.391*** 0.408*** 
 (0.400) (0.283) (0.360) (0.180) (0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Prog. Assistance 0.0008* 0.0005 0.0009 0.0006 0.001*** -0.036*** -0.035*** 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.058) (0.244) (0.100) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.365) (0.362) 
Action on Debt 0.0007* 0.0004 0.0008** 0.0004 0.001*** -0.002 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.005*** 
 (0.073) (0.323) (0.041) (0.343) (0.004) (0.690) (0.565) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hum. Assistance  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.043*** -0.045*** 0.003 0.0005 
 (0.210) (0.222) (0.306) (0.103) (0.019) (0.001) (0.000) (0.305) (0.836) 
Social Infrastructure 0.002 --- --- --- 0.006*** 0.004 0.015 0.391*** 0.012** 
 (0.195)    (0.000) (0.862) (0.520) (0.000) (0.033) 
Econ. Infrastructure  --- 0.008 --- --- -0.0001 0.036*** 0.043*** 0.016*** 0.004*** 
  (0.301)   (0.805) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Productive Sector --- --- 0.002*** --- 0.0003 -0.013 -0.022 0.002** 0.006* 
   (0.008)  (0.686) (0.373) (0.167) (0.042) (0.098) 
Multi Sector --- --- --- -0.0003 0.001** 0.018 0.016 0.005 0.001 
    (0.757) (0.040) (0.356) (0.446) (0.117) (0.678) 
AR(1) (0.117) (0.114) (0.096)* (0.119) (0.122) --- --- --- --- 
AR(2) (0.784) (0.516) (0.569) (0.918) (0.574) --- --- --- --- 
Sargan OIR (0.232) (0.143) (0.098)* (0.243) (0.116) --- --- --- --- 
Hansen OIR (0.441) (0.497) (0.279) (0.364) (0.639) --- --- --- --- 
          
DHT for instruments          
(a)Instruments in levels          
H excluding group (0.650) (0.688) (0.587) (0.707) (0.470) --- --- --- --- 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.303) (0.341) (0.180) (0.214) (0.641) --- --- --- --- 
(b) IV (years, eq (diff))          
H excluding group (0.311) (0.619) (0.368) (0.794) (0.500) --- --- --- --- 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.565) (0.317) (0.249) (0.114) (0.708) --- --- --- --- 
          
Hausman  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 78.01*** 68.23*** 
Adjusted R² --- --- --- --- --- 0.374 0.408 --- --- 
Within  R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.370 0.337 
LSDV R² --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.984 0.987 
Fisher (LSDV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 248.42*** 284.69*** 
Fisher  1835*** 1611*** 2033*** 2312*** 11324*** 21.083*** 21.718*** --- --- 
Instruments  25 25 25 25 37 --- --- --- --- 
Countries  38 38 38 38 38 42 41 42 41 
Observations  187 187 187 187 187 236 211 236 211 
£          
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Econ: Economic. Prog: Programme. Hum: Humanitarian. DHT: Difference in 
Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold 
values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null 
hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. LSDV: Least 
Squares Dummy Variable.  Cont: Contemporary. Non-cont: Non-contemporary.  HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity & Autocorrelation Consistent 
Standard Errors. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.  
 
 
As for Panel A, while the first-four specifications control for multicollinearity, the 
fifth specification relaxes the assumption. First, in relation to previous findings/modelling, 
while the negative sign of the humanitarian assistance variable remains unchanged, the 
effects of programme assistance and action on debt are now positive. The reason for this 
difference could be traceable to the drop in cross-sections from 42(41) to 38. This drop is 
accompanied by a decrease in degrees of freedom. Another possible explanation could be the 
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result of controlling for time-effects. Second, the effect of the aid dynamics with some high 
degree of substitution are positive, but for the impact of economic infrastructure.  
The post-estimation tests confirm the validity of the instruments and absence of 
autocorrelation. Accordingly, the null hypotheses of the difference-in-Hansen test for 
instrument exogeneity and Arellano & Bond (1991) autocorrelation test are not rejected.  
In cross-examining the OLS, FE and GMM results, only the effects of program 
assistance and action on debt are ambiguous. Hence, in the concluding implications that 
follow, meant to clarify the questionable economics of foreign aid for inclusive development, 
we urge the reader to consider the expositional/cautious character of the discussions related to 
the ambiguous results (of program assistance and action on debt).  
 
4. Concluding implications 
 
The use of foreign aid as a policy instrument to promote development in recipient countries 
has been object of a lot of debate (Gibson et al., 2014; Arvin & Barillas, 2002; Arvin et al., 
2002; Balde, 2011)
5
. We resist the itch of engaging the debate over whether foreign aid is 
generally good or bad. Such engagement would be irrelevant on two principal counts. First, 
development assistance is like a policy, whose outcome depends on its implementation. 
Second, while Donors may have some strategic interests, recipients also have their fair share 
of blame for the outcome of allocated funds.  
 The following findings have been established. First, the impacts of aid dynamics with 
high degrees of substitution are positive. These include, aid for: social infrastructure, 
economic infrastructure, the productive sector and the multi-sector.  Second, the effect of 
humanitarian assistance is consistently negative across specifications and models. Third, the 
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 Inter alia: the interested can consider: (1) Efobi et al. (2014) versus (vs) Asongu (2012) & Okada & Samreth 
(2012); (2) Eubank (2012) vs Asongu (2014b) and; (3) Kangoye (2013) vs Asongu (2014c).  
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effects of programme assistance and action on debts are ambiguous because they become 
positive with the GMM technique. 
 Given the substantial reliance of the African continent on development assistance, the 
findings reflect the narrative of a general tendency in declining poverty relative to the rest of 
the world (Fosu, 2015; Young, 2012). While it is not our intention to claim that ‘the relative 
decline in poverty’ and ‘Africa being on time for certain Millennium Development Poverty 
targets’ (Pinkivskiy &  Sala-i-Martin, 2014) are essentially due to development assistance, it 
is worthwhile noting that multilateral development agencies like the African Development 
Bank (AfDB) have had a strategic focus on infrastructural development in the continent. 
Hence, given the positive inclusive human development outcome from foreign aid allocated 
for infrastructural development in our analysis, we cannot overlook the substantial work of 
the AfDB.  
The negative effect of humanitarian assistance implies that mechanisms by which such 
funds are channelled may be reconsidered. This is consistent with the underlying study 
motivating this clarification: “Though the stated intents or purposes of aid are socio-
economic, the actual impact from the findings negates this. It is a momentous epoque to solve 
the second tragedy of foreign aid; it is high time economists and policy makers start 
rethinking the models and theories on which foreign aid is based. In the meantime, it is up to 
people who care about the poor to hold aid agencies accountable for piecemeal results” 
(Asongu, 2014a, p. 455).  
In light of the above, we provide some recommendations for a rethinking of theories 
and models on which development assistance is based. Drawing on Piketty’s celebrated 
literature that has substantially debunked the Kuznets’ conjectures to which foreign aid 
policies have been aligned, we suggest that developed countries should oriented developing 
nations towards industrialisation by focusing more on inequality and less on economic 
14 
 
growth. This is broadly consistent with an evolving narrative on inequality in the continent 
(Elu, 2013; Mthuli et al., 2014; Brada & Bah, 2014; Asongu et al., 2014; Anyanwu, 2011, 
2014)
6
.  
We do not resist the itch of providing some discussion on the ambiguous results from 
action on debt. According to Boyce & Ndikumana (2011), such action is motivated by at least 
three reasons: past debts have not benefitted the poor; borrowing arrangements were without 
popular consent and historical evidence shows ‘creditor awareness’ of recipients’ insolvency. 
Hence, a priori, the results are expected to positively impact human development because debt 
cancellation/reduction reflects positive macroeconomic income/fiscal externalities that should 
be reinvested into domestic economies to enhance human development. The ambiguity in 
results is broadly consistent with Asongu et al. (2014) who have investigated the Azzimonti et 
al. (2014) conclusions that globalisation-driven debts increase income-inequality. Their 
findings which are based on the same periodicity and sample (as in this study) show that the 
effect on inclusive human development depends on whether the debts are interactive with or 
endogenous to globalisation.  
Overall, while the findings are broadly consistent with Asiedu (2014), Gyimah-
Brempong & Racine (2014) and Kargbo & Sen (2014), they also raise some questions on 
previous celebrated foreign aid literatures. For instance, humanitarian assistance which 
survives salient criticisms from Moyo’s Dead Aid has been found to have a negative effect on 
                                                             
6
 Two issues are worth noting here. First, Africa’s declining poverty is relative to the periodicity under 
consideration. For instance, 1980-2010 and 1995-2010 produce different tendencies relative to the rest of the 
world (Fosu, 2015). Second, declining poverty is not equal to declining inequality because the latter is critical in 
the growth effects on the former. The interested reader can refer to an extensive literature by Fosu (2008, 2009, 
2010abc, 2011). “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of 
inequality” (Fosu, 2010c, p. 818); “The responsiveness of poverty to income is a decreasing function of 
inequality, and the inequality elasticity of poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 
2010a, p. 1432); and “In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing 
poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” (Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
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inclusive human development. Moreover, the Fofack (2014) conjecture of self-reliance as 
means to African development is not consistent with the findings.  
As a technical policy implication, like in Efobi et al. (2014), distinguishing types of 
foreign aid is critical to advancing empirical conclusions on the aid-development nexus. This 
is essentially because previous findings using the same dependent variable that have grouped 
aid as a single indicator have shown a negative effect (Asongu, 2014a), a tendency that is 
consistent across conditional distributions of the dependent variable  (Asongu, 2014d).  
When the findings are considered in the light of deep policy challenges of our time, 
the principal social implication is that foreign aid can be instrumental in inclusive capitalism. 
It could be used to avoid/mitigate setbacks of the Kuznets theory and help developing 
countries embrace globalisation/industrialisation in light of Piketty.  Foreign aid can be 
instrumental in inclusive human development if above measures are considered, inter alia:  in 
stimulating Knowledge economy (KE) which has been established to reduce inequality 
(Lustig, 2011) and emphasising on gender equality. These are clearly avenues of future 
research that should go a long way in clarifying provocative titles like ‘foreign aid follies’ 
(Rogoff, 2014) or sceptical conclusions from more substantive surveys of 40 years of foreign 
aid literature (Doucouliagos & Paldam, 2008, 2009).  
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